Comparative study of Buddhist, Vedanta, and Kashmir Śaiva philosophies.

Michel Surya revient, dans l’entretien qu’il a accordé aux Cahiers philosophiques de Strasbourg, sur sa lecture de Kafka : sur les différentes étapes qu’elle a traversées au fil des œuvres, sur les différentes hypothèses auxquelles elle a donné naissance. À partir de plusieurs thématiques (pourquoi la honte semble-t-elle revenir sans cesse chez Kafka? En quoi peut-on dire qu’il y a dans ses textes une pensée de l’histoire qui est à l’œuvre, et comment celle-ci s’inscrit-elle dans une histoire de la (...) taupe et du souterrain en littérature? Que donne à penser la métamorphose, comme texte et comme processus, de ce que devient l’homme au xxe siècle?, etc.), Michel Surya continue de lire Kafka – si c’est en philosophe ou non, cela fait problème, et c’est précisément l’un de ceux qu’aborde cet entretien. 291-303. (shrink)

Influence of the fundamentals of Sankhya and Yoga on Indic philosophy; a study.

Classical commentary on Pañcapādikā of Padmapādācārya, 8th cent., work on Advaita Vedanta philosophy; includes Śrīcandramañjarī commentary.

Commentary on Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, work on Vedanta philosophy.

The Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntabhūṣaṇa of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, part 1, with the Nirañjanī Commentary by Ram-yatna Shukla and Prakāsa Explanatory Notes by K. V. Ramakrishnamacharyulu. Critically edited by K. V. Ramakrishnamacharyulu. South Asian Perspectives, no. 6; Shree Somnath Sanskrit University Shastragrantha Series, no. 2. Pondichery: Institut Français de Pondichéry; Veraval, Gujarat: Shree Somnath Sanskrit University, 2015. Pp. xl + 592. Rs. 1200, €52.

Study of Yogasūtra of Patañjali with Yogabhāṣya of Vyāsa and philosophy of Osho on Yoga philosophy.

Classical digest with English explanation on Mimamsa school in Hindu philosophy.

Classical digest, with commentary, of the Mimamsa school in Hindu philosophy.

On Sikh doctrines inunciated by Guru Nanak.

Research papers on fundamentals of Dvaita Vedanta philosophy.

Verse treatise, with Prakasika commentary, on fundamentals of the Mīmāṃsā school in Hindu philosophy.

Supercommentary on Gauḍabrahmānandī of Brahmānandasarasvatī, 17th cent., commentary on Advaitabrahmasiddhi of Madhūsudana Sarasvatī, work on Advaita philosophy ; includes complete text of Advaitabrahmasiddhi and Gauḍabrahmānandī.

Commentary on the Śabdakhaṇḍa of Tattvacintāmaṇi, work on verbal epistemology of the neo-Nyaya school in Indic philosophy.

Three treatises Candrikāmaṇḍana of Satyatīrtha, Candrikākhaṇḍana of Rāmasubbāśāstrī and Candrikāprakāśaprasāra of Gauḍagerī Veṅkaṭaramaṇācārya, deals with the justification and interpretation of some points in Tātparyacandrikā of Vyāsatīrtha, work on Dvaita(Vedanta) philosophy.

Supercommentary on Tattvacintāmaṇi, classical work on Navya Nyaya philosophy by Gaṅgeśa, active 13th century and its commentaries Didhiti by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhitiprakāśa by Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa with complete text.

Commentary on Tarkasangrahadīpikā with Bālapriyā and Prasāraṇa suppercommentaries on Tarkasȧngraha of Annambhaṭṭa, 17th century work on Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy; includes complete text of Tarkasaṅgraha and Tarkadīpikā by Annaṃbhaṭṭa.

Treatise with commentary on Mimamsa school in Hindu philosophy.

Neo-Nyaya treatise on verbal testimony, presenting semantic approaches to Sanskrit case and suffix; includes seven Sanskrit commentaries and exhaustive introduction in English.

Classical treatise on Jaina philosophy; critical edition.

Commentary on Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, based on Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy.

Śaṅkarācārya's commentary with supercommentary on Catuḥsūtra of Brahmasūtra.

Supercommentary on Praśastapādabhāṣya of Praśastapādācārya, commemtary on Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda, compendium of Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

Supercommentary on Tattvaprakāśikā of Jayatīrtha, 14th cent., work on Dvaita (Vedanta) philosophy; includes supercommentaries.

There is a widespread belief in Hinduism that Vyāsa, the alleged editor of the Vedas and author of the Mahābhārata, is identical with Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Brahma-sūtra. The identification of these two mythic characters, however, originated between 800–980 CE, after the likes of Śaṅkara, Padmapāda, and Bhāskara, but before Vācaspati Miśra, Prakāśātman, Sarvajñātman, and Yāmuna. The purpose of this paper is to understand how and why such identification took place. The argument developed here is that the Bādarāyaṇa-Vyāsa identity (...) was invented by the author of or community behind the Bhāgavata Purāṇa as part of a complex of self-representation strategies. The Bhāgavata intentionally makes itself a work of Vedānta, indeed the Brahma-sūtra itself, over which it builds a new soteriology that is centered on the idea of bhakti. Two factors in particular stand out in light of the Bhāgavata’s Vedāntic background: Vyāsa’s paradigmatic character as the preserver of old dharma and the innovator, visionary, of new soteriologies; and the image of Vyāsa’s son Śuka as the model ascetic and ideal candidate for the new soteriological vision, through whom the Bhāgavata community chose to represent itself. (shrink)

_In his book_ The Yogasūtra of Patañjali: A New Introduction to the Buddhist Roots of the Yoga System_, Pradeep Gokhale reveals a new picture of the Yogasūtra. He shows us, verse after verse, Buddhist influences on this classical text, which is usually seen as rooted in the Sā__ṃ__khya tradition. Gokhale does not merely argue that Patañjali borrows from Buddhist sources; he substantiates his argument with numerous detailed examples, traveling back and forth between Patañjali and Buddhist thinkers such as Asa__ṅ__ga and (...) Vasubandhu. Gokhale further argues that Vyāsa, Patañjali’s most authoritative commentator, makes a __political move in his commentary by distancing Patañjali from the Buddhists and situating him on the “right side” of the philosophical map, namely the __ā__stika side, the side of the loyalists of the Veda. __The implications are __far-reaching. First, __Patañjali and Vyāsa cannot be one and the same person, as claimed by solid Yogasūtra scholars such as Philipp Maas. __Second, the Patañjali of the Yogasūtra cannot be identified with his namesake, the __author of the Mahābhā__ṣ__ya, “The Great Commentary” on some of the themes discussed by Pā__ṇ__ini, the forefather of Indian linguistics. Patañjali, the linguist, is dated to the 2nd or 3rd century BCE; Patañjali of the Yogasūtra would now have to be pushed forward to the 5th century CE as Gokhale implies. Like Daya Krishna before him, Gokhale highlights the contribution of Buddhist texts and thinkers, often undermined or marginalized in the narrative of the history of Indian philosophy, at least as __it is __sketched in India. In this respect, I briefly visit Daya Krishna’s essay “Was Ācārya Śa__ṅ__kara responsible for the disappearance of Buddhist Philosophy from India?” (1999). Finally, I mention Karen O’Brien-Kop’s research. Like Gokhale, she makes an attempt to join the dots between Pātañjala-yoga and the Buddhist Yogācāra._. (shrink)

"On se prend à rêver la situation de Nietzsche faisant retour sur sa vie pour écrire lui-même l'origine de sa pensée dans un livre qui montre qu'il se crée lui-même en tant que dieu-philosophe de l'écriture dionysiaque." (Sarah Kofman) Jugnon le sait de longue date qui s'en est fait tôt une méthode, ou un moyen, ou une liberté supplémentaires, dont chacun des livres tient à la fois de l'installation, du montage, du collage. Il en a l'art. l'Ivre Nietzsche n'y déroge (...) pas. Installation, montage, collage, pas pour que joue ensemble ce qui n'aurait rien à voir, mais pour que fasse "ensemble" ce qu'on n'a jamais fait jouer. Nul mieux que lui ne lit sans doute ; nul mieux que lui ne lie, surtout, lisant, écrivant, qui lit pour lier, c'est-à-dire qui lit doublement, amenant au jour, montrant des formes (d'écriture, de pensée) inaperçues jusqu'alors, qu'il mélange dans un shaker, qu'il agite ensuite. Agitation iconoclaste : le cocktail est raide, fait pour l'ivresse, fait pour danser & penser, comme on danse & pense (denser/panser) sous un volcan, comme danse & pense l'ivre vice-consul d'Au-dessous du volcan — lui aussi pris dans l'effroi de son éternel retour propre. Michel Surya. (shrink)

In the recent literature on contextualism and relativism, one often finds disputes as to which kind of consideration would be relevant for positing a feature of a context as a parameter in the ‘‘circumstance of evaluation’: via the presence of an operator in the language which shifts that feature (Stanley) or by being a feature of a context with respect to which the truth of ‘‘propositions’’ expressed in the context is relative (McFarlane). This kind of dispute arises from two different (...) independent roles that elements in ‘‘circumstances of evaluation’’ are sometimes assumed to have. I distinguish indices from points of evaluation, and motivate its significance in the debate. (shrink)

Reponse to Peter Milne (2005)'s argument agaist maximalism about truthmaking.

Several authors have argued that socially significant places such as countries, cities and establishments are immaterial objects, despite their being spatially located. In contrast, we aim to defend a reductive materialist view of such entities, which identifies them with their physical territories or premises. Accordingly, these are all material objects; typically, aggregates of land and infrastructure. Admittedly, our terms for these entities may also sometimes be used to denote their associated groups of people. But as long as countries, cities and (...) establishments are understood as places, we submit, they are all material objects: the physical territories or premises of their associated groups. (shrink)

Tesis doctoral presentada en el departament de Lògica Història i Filosofia de la Ciencia de la Universitat de Barcelona per optar al títol de Doctor en Filosofia.

My aim is to defend a peculiar epistemic version of the particularity thesis, which results from a sui generis combination of what I call the ‘singular relational view’ and what I call the ‘relativistic content view.’ Particulars are not represented as part of putative singular content. Instead, we are perceptually acquainted with them in the relevant sense that experience puts us in direct perceptual contact with them. And the content of experience is best modeled as a propositional function, that is, (...) the content of a complex predicate that is true or false only relative to some circumstances of evaluation. (shrink)